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Notes
ALl Proposals To Expand
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: Solution
to Multiparty, Multistate Controversies?
The recent study by the American Law Institute of the
division of jurisdiction between state and federal courts
resulted generally in r-ecommending the contraction of
federal diversity jurisdiction. In the area of multiparty,
multistate controversies, however, the ALI recommended
the exopansion of diversity jurisdiction as a means of pro-
viding a forum for cases the state courts are not equipped
to hear. The author of this Note considers the proposal
and concludes that the ALI's solution to the problem
sought to be solved, primarily providing jurisdiction over
the indispensable-necessary party who is beyond the
jurisdiction of the state court, raises several difficulties,
the most basic of which is that of accommodating the
state policies reflected in the state's limitation of juris-
diction. He suggests that a possible alternative solution
would be to authorize state courts to issue nationwide
service of proess.
I. INTRODUCTION
The present utilization of diversity as a head of federal juris-
diction is better explained by the lack of sufficient interest to
eliminate it than by any useful purpose it serves.' In the course of
its development diversity jurisdiction has been justified as a means
of providing an impartial forum for commercial litigants engaged
in multistate enterprise, as a tool to aid in the development of a
federal common law, and as a method of providing a just resolu-
tion of conflicts of laws in suits between citizens of different
states? At the present time it is doubtful whether state courts
are either significantly prejudiced against out of staters or inade-
quate forums for commercial litigation;3 the decision in Erie R..
1. See Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code,
13 Lw & CozNm,. PROB. 216, 84-40 (1948).
2. See HART & Wc nsi, Tm FEERAL CoARND THE FEzaERA Srarm
896-97 (1953) [hereinafter cited as HnT & WEcHsiLu].
S. AM, STuDY oF THE DVmSION or imusicTioN BErwEEN STATE A Fm-
EAL CouRTS 5s2-55 (tentative draft No. 2, 1963) [hereinafter cited as ALl,
STuDn]; Yntema &, afire, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 7T9
U. PA. L. REv. 869 (1931).
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v. Tompkins4 marked the end of diversity jurisdiction as an in-
strument in developing a federal common law; and the Klaxon Co.
v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.' decision eliminated whatever utility
exists in an independent federal resolution of conflicts of laws
questions in diversity cases."
The American Law Institute proposals to expand diversity
jurisdiction in multiparty, multistate controversies afford an op-
portunity to examine a different justification for this head of
federal jurisdiction. The ALI proposals, like federal interpleader,
employ diversity jurisdiction primarily as a means of hearing
cases that a state court can not or will not hear.' Thus under pro-
posed section 2341(a) a plaintiff would be able to invoke the juris-
diction of a federal district court if:
the several defendants who are necessary for a just adjudication of the
plaintiff's claim are not all amenable to process of any one territorialjurisdiction, and one of any two adverse parties is a citizen of a State
and the other is a citizen or subject of another territorial jurisdiction.8
and under proposed section 2343(a) a defendant would be entitled
to remove to the district court if:
one or more additional parties necessary for a just adjudication as to a
defendant cannot be joined or with the exercise of reasonable diligence
served with process or otherwise made subject to a fully effective judg-
ment of the courts of that State .... 9
The purpose of this Note is to consider the relative seriousness
of the problems the ALI proposals are designed to solve and the
problems the proposals appear to create. Attention will first be
directed at the scope of the indispensable-necessary party prob-
lem; next the extent of the territorial limitations on a state court's
jurisdiction will be considered; then the ALI proposals will be
examined from the standpoint of their constitutionality and their
desirability.
II. INDISPENSABLE-NECESSARY PARTY PROBLEM
The ALI proposals are principally directed to the problem of
the indispensable party who is beyond the jurisdiction of a state
court. The generally accepted definition of an indispensable party
is one who has an interest in the controversy that will necessarily
be affected by a final decree unless the decree is framed in a man-
4. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
5. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
6. HART & WECHSLER 896-97.
7. See ALI, STUDY 129-30. The proposals will also cover some cases that
could be adjudicated in a state court. See id. at 137.
8. ALI, STUDY 35.
9. ALI, STUDY 37.
ner that makes the final termination of the controversy incon-
sistent with equity and good conscience." If a state court
determines that an absentee beyond the jurisdiction of that court
is indispensable, the action must be dismissed. If no state court
can obtain jurisdiction over all indispensable parties, the plaintiff
is left without an opportunity to adjudicate his claim."
To clarify discussion, the distinction drawn by the federal
courts between necessary and indispensable parties will be used
in this Note.' In the federal courts a "necessary" party must be
joined if he is within the jurisdiction of the court; an "indispensa-
ble" party is one without whom the action must be dismissed.
The state courts draw the same distinction for practical purposes;
that is, they will require dismissal of the action if one type of
party cannot be joined, while they will proceed with the action
if another type of party is beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
Since the state courts are less likely to apply different labels to
these two distinct types of parties, the federal court labels -
"indispensable" and "necessary"- will serve as useful designa-
tions. The ALI proposals encompass both the necessary and the
indispensable party categories.1 3 Obviously, their application to
the indispensable party problem is more important because of
the possible inability of the plaintiff to adjudicate his claim. But
the ALI proposals, in applying to cases where necessary parties
are beyond the reach of any state court, would increase the
efficiency and fairness sacrificed when such cases are not heard in
their entirety.
10. Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 189 (1855). Here all the
parties to a contract were held indispensable in an action to rescind. Although
this was a federal case, the principle is the same in the state courts.
11. It is highly improbable that the plaintiff would be able to successfully
invoke the diversity jurisdiction of a federal court in such a situation. The
federal and state rules as to parties are very similar. See note 12 infra. Even
if the federal party rules would ordinarily permit the suit to be brought in the
federal district court, -the outcome-determinative test of Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) might prevent a federal adjudication where the local
state court would -not permit one. See Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.. 183 (1947);
Dunham v. Robertson, 198 Fad 316 (10th Cir. 1952). But see Ford v. Adldns,
39 F. Supp. 472 (E.D. Ill. 1941); 3 MoonE, FEomL PnAcricE 1907, at
2152-53 (2d ed. 1963).
12. In the federal courts, parties are divided into four categories: formal,
proper, necessary, and indispensable. Id. 19.02, at 2103. In the state courts,
it is more common to fuse the necessary and indispensable groupings under
the necessary heading but, in fact, to recognize that some necessary parties
are so essential -that a dismissal is required in their absence. See Comment,
Parties: Necessary and Indispensable Parties, 29 C.ALiF. L. lEv. 731, 733 (1941).
13. Section 2,41(a) provides a federal forum where parties necessary to a
just adjudication of the plaintiffs claim are -beyond the jurisdiction of any state
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The proper approach in cases where the court cannot obtain
jurisdiction over interested absentees is to balance the desire
to give the plaintiff as much merited relief as possible against the
policies underlying the indispensable party doctrine. 14 The rea-
sons for a finding of indispensability are that by continuing the
suit without the absentee, the defendant might be prejudiced by
being subjected to double liability or a multiplicity of suits,"5 the
absentee might be prejudiced by a determination in which his
interests are not represented," or the court might be powerless
to formulate an effective decree.' 7 From these reasons have
evolved rules, among which are: all parties to a contract are in-
dispensable in an action for rescission's or specific performance; 1
joint obligees are indispensable in an action to enforce the obliga-
court. See note 8 supra. This is the essence of the necessary party concept for
purposes of compulsory joinder, ALI, S'uvy 133-34, and necessarily includes
indispensable parties, since without them plaintiff cannot maintain his action
at all. Section 2341(b) makes explicit the application to parties without whom
an action on the claim must ,be dismissed. See note 55 infra. Section 2343 per-
mits a defendant to remove if parties necessary to a just adjudication as to
him cannot be brought before the state court in which plaintiff instituted the
action. See note 15 infra. This -section applies only to necessary parties since,
by hypothesis, plaintiff 'has -been able to bring his action in a state court.
14. See Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 Micn. L.
Rav. S27, 336-40 (1957).
15. When this reason is the basis for dismissal, the defendant has a legiti-
mate interest in -bringing a party before the court-not just a desire to avoid
liability to the plaintiff in the particular action. Nothing will motivate the
plaintiff to bring in this type of indispensable party. The ALI proposals would
allow removal jurisdiction where such a party could not be subjected to the
jurisdiction of the state court in which the action was brought. See ALI, Svuty
37 (proposed § 2343).
16. As in a decision distributing a fund to which the absentee 'has a su-
perior legal claim, although his legal rights are not affected, from a factual
standpoint the absentee's claim is greatly reduced in value. See Developments
in the Law: Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HAnv. L. 1REv.
874, 882 (1958).
17. In an action against a corporation for a declaration of dividends, a ma-
jority of the board of directors is essential to afford complete relief. But of.
Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 760 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 983 (1950), in which the court's power over the corporation's prop-
erty within the state made it possible to compel the necessary action 'by the
absent directors. See Developments in the Law: Multiparty Litigation in the
Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. REv. 874, 885 (1958).
18. Steinbach v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 172 N.Y. 471, 65 N.E.
281 (1902); see 3 MooRE, FFERAL PRACTicE 19.10, at 2167-68 (2d ed. 1963),
citing federal cases; the principle is equally applicable in state decisions, see
2 WEINsTInI", Koa & MmLzn, Naw YoRx Crvm PRAcvxcE 1001.06, at 10-7
(1964).
19. Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 139 (1885).
tion; . all the claimants are indispensable in a suit to determine
the disposition of a fund- 1 and a majority of the board of direc-
tors is indispensable in an action against a corporation seeking the
declaration of a dividend.F A blind application of these rules,
however, fails to consider the plaintiff's interest in obtaining what-
ever relief the court is empowered to accord himP
A flexible approach to the indispensable party problem,2' tak-
ing into account the plaintiff's claim for relief, would reduce but
not eliminate the problem the ALI proposals are designed to solve.
Consideration of the plaintiff's claim for relief would result in
fewer cases where an adjudication was refused entirely. But in
some cases the adverse effect on the defendant, the absentee, or
the court of hearing the suit without the absentee would still re-
sult in a refusal to adjudicate. In addition, since the ALI propo-
sals would apply to necessary as well as indispensable parties..
their adoption would result in some increase in efficiency and
fairness no matter how flexibly the indispensable party doctrine
was applied by the state courts.
I. EXTRA-TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION PROBLEM
The indispensable party problem would be nonexistent if there
were no territorial limitations on state court jurisdiction. Unless
the absentee is beyond the jurisdiction of the state court, he can
be joined and the action can proceed.
A state court's jurisdictional reach is bounded by the limitations
of the fourteenth amendment due process clause unless further
20. See Comment, 29 CAIA. L. lRnv. 731, 736-37 n"2 (1941).
21. See 3 Moos, FDsmar PRAcTCn 19.08, at 2155-56 (2d ed. 1963).
22. Cf. Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 760 (3d Cir),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 983 (1950).
23. See Hazard, Indispenable Party: The Historical Origin of a Proce-
dural Phantom, 61 Colm. L. Itsv. 1254, 1287-89 (1961).
24. The New York Civil Practice Law and Rules illustrates an attempt to
consider equitable factors in deciding whether to dismiss an action for want
of an absent party, rather than to make a rigid conceptual distinction between
necessary and indispensable parties. New York Civ. Pnac. L. & R1. § 1001 (.b);
see 2"WnmsmTn, KoRNs & Mumi, Naw YoRK Crvnm PAcTicz 1001.08,
.09 .(1964).
The proposed amendment of FED. R. Civ. P. 19 embodies a flexible ap-
proach t9 he problem stated in terms of "contingently necessary" persons. See
Ccimmittee on Rules of Practice & Procedure of -the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the
United States District Courts 55-59 (preliminary draft 1904).
25. ALI, STruy 133-35. The necessary party cases would probably be the
most important in terms of the number brought -before the federal courts-
particularly if the indispensable party doctrine is relaxed.
1964] NOTE 1113
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1109
restricted by the limitations of the state's jurisdictional statutes. 0
As a limitation on a state court's exercise of personal jurisdiction,
Pennoyer v. Neff 17 read into the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment the "rules and principles which have been
established in our systems of jurisprudence for the protection and
enforcement of private rights. '28 At the time Pennoyer was decided
these established rules and principles meant that presence or
actual consent was required for the invocation of personal juris-
diction by a state court.20 After Pennoyer it became clear that
domicile3 0 and implied consents' would also support personal juris-
diction. Both these bases of personal jurisdiction permit a state
court decree to bind extra-territorial defendants. The approach
taken by the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton,82 however, makes them superfluous. Under International Shoe,
whether a state court has validly obtained jurisdiction over an
out-of-state defendant depends on whether the defendant has had
sufficient contacts with the state to justify requiring him to de-
fend an action there. 3 After International Shoe, which sustained
jurisdiction on the basis of substantial in-state activities giving
rise to the cause of action sued upon, the extra-territorial reach
of state court jurisdiction has been further extended. Perkins v.
Benquet Cons. Mining Co.84 upheld a state court's right to exer-
cise jurisdiction in a cause of action not related to the defendant's
substantial in-state activities, and in McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 5 jurisdiction over an out-of-state insurance company, in
a suit brought by the only policyholder in the forum state, was
found to satisfy the due process requirements.
26. The judicial doctrine of forum non conveniens provides an additional
limitation on a court's exercise of jurisdiction. However, the doctrine is not
universally recognized and is infrequently applied even when it is available. See
generally Developments in the Law - State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAie. L.
REv. 909, 1008-17 (1960).
27. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
28. Id. at 733.
29. According to Pennoyer, in order for a state court to obtain personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, "he must be brought within its jurisdiction
by service of process within the State, or 'his voluntary appearance." Ibid.
30. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). Domicile is an independent
basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction, not a limitation on the presence
theory. See Developments in the Law - State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 Htnv. L.
Rav. 909, 916-17 (1960).
31. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawlosld, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
82. 826 US. 310 (1945).
38. Id. at 316.
34. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
35. 355 US. 220 (1957).
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As a counterbalance to the liberal assumption of jurisdiction
in McGee, Hanson v. Denckla"6 serves as a reminder that "it is a
mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of
all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts." ' The
due process limitations are no longer as restrictive, and the nature
of the inquiry prevents a precise predetermination of the existence
of jurisdiction, but an appropriate factual connection between the
parties and the forum is still required if a state court is validly
to obtain jurisdiction.
Few states claim to authorize jurisdiction coextensive with the
due process limitations,3 but several have enacted long arm
statutes which extend the jurisdiction of their courts beyond the
territorial boundaries in certain circumstances.39 As the American
public has become more mobile and the economy more complex,
the significance of state boundaries has decreased, creating a need
for extending the jurisdictional authority of state courts in order
to vindicate state interests. Continued statutory expansion of
state court jurisdiction seems likely.
The present expansion of state court jurisdiction, like the adop-
tion of a flexible approach to indispensable party problems, can re-
duce, but not eliminate, the problem at which the ALI proposals
are directed. A reliable forecast of the rate at which states will
choose to extend their extra-territorial jurisdiction is impossible.
At the present time some state limitations on the exercise of juris-
diction are based on substantive policy considerations, which are
86. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
37. Id. at 251. One legal commentator has expressed regret at the ma-
jority's effort to distinguish McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957), which is based in part on the lack of state regulation of an exceptional
activity in Hanson. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Procws Clause and
the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Car. L. REv. 569, 621-22(1958).
38. The Rhode Island statute, however, -provides jurisdiction over all par-
ties "that shall -have the necessary minimum contacts with the state of Rhode
Island" in cases where the assumption of jurisdiction is "not contrary to the
provisions of the constitution or laws of the United States." R.I. GN. LAws
A~w. § 9-5-83 (Supp. 1963). The Wisconsin statute is also designed to go to
the due process limitations. See Foster, E'panding Jurisdiction Over Non-
residents, 32 Wis. BAR BuLr_. Sun'. 3, 4 (1959).
39. See IDAHo CoD AwN. § 5-514 (Supp. 1963); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
§§ 16, 17 (1963); A. Rav. STAT. ANN. ch. 112, § 21 (1954); Mcr. STAT. A.N-N.
§ 27A.705 (1962); N.M. STAT. Amx. § 21-3-16 (Supp. 1963); N.Y. Civ. PrAc.
L. & Rt. § 302(a); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145(a) (1960); RI. GN. LAws
AN.§ 9-5-33 (Supp. 1963); WAsar. REv. CoDE § 4.28.185 (Supp. 1959); Wis.
STAT. § 262.05 (1961).
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unlikely to change.4° Furthermore, Hanson v. Denckla41 indicates
that no matter how far a state may wish to extend its extra-
territorial exercise of personal jurisdiction, there is some point
beyond which the due process limitations prohibit this extension.
The largest group of cases to which the ALI proposals would
apply is that in which necessary or indispensable parties cannot
be subjected to the jurisdiction of any state court because the
jurisdictional statutes of the relevant states do not extend far
enough. If, for example, A and B are jointly owed money by C,
a resident of another state, on an obligation incurred in C's state,
which does not provide jurisdiction over extra-territorial persons
on the basis of a single in-state act, then A cannot obtain a judg-
ment against C if neither B nor C is willing to participate in an ac-
tion outside his own state. The ALI proposals would also apply to
an extremely small group of cases where the only limitations on the
extra-territorial jurisdiction of the relevant state courts were those
imposed by the fourteenth amendment due process clause. An
example is the joint obligee situation, if the obligor is from a
different state and the obligation is incurred outside the United
States.
IV. PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE ALI PROPOSALS
A. CONSTITUTIONALITY
In Strawbridge v. Curts.?2 the Supreme Court construed the
Judiciary Act of 1789,43 which contained language very similar to
the constitutional authorization for diversity jurisdiction, to re-
quire each party having an interest on one side of a controversy to
be from a different state than each party with the same interest
on the other side. The ALI proposals would provide diversity
jurisdiction in the federal district courts if any two adverse parties
are of diverse citizenship. This attempt to encompass as large a
portion as possible of multiparty cases that cannot be satisfac-
torily adjudicated in any state court raises an unresolved consti-
tutional question." Since Strawbridge the possibility has existed
that total diversity is a constitutional requirement for federal
diversity jurisdiction.
40. See 1 WzENSmN, KoRN & MmLE, Naw YoRx CIVIL PRAcrimc 302.1I
(1963).
41. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
42. 7 U.S. (8 Cranch) 266 (1806).
43. 1 Stat. 78.
44. Compare Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 145 (1855), with
Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61, 64 (1885). The question was expressly re-
served in Trienies v. Sunshine Mining Corp., 308 U.S. 66, 71 (1939).
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The Al draftsmen present an exhaustive constitutional justi-
fication for the minimal diversity requirement in the proposals.' 5
The Judiciary Act phrase construed in Strawbridge40 differs from
the constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction.'7 Even if this
language difference is not in itself dispositive,4 8 in general con-
stitutional language may justifiably be more liberally construed
than similar statutory language.49 A difference in the purposes of
the constitutional and statutory diversity grants provides a pos-
sible basis for distinguishing Strawbridge.5 ° There are several
instances in whieh the federal courts have upheld diversity juris-
45. See ALI, Smny 176-86 (Supporting Memoranda A).
46. "[W]here ... the suit is between a citizen of the state where the suit
is brought, and a citizen of another state." 1 Stat. 78 (1789). (Emphasis added.)
47. The Constitution extends diversity jurisdiction to "controversies" be-
tween citizens of different states. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
48. It is arguable that the difference between a "suit" and a "controversy"
would support a different result if the constitutional grant of diversity juris-
diction were construed. See ALI, STuDy 177. In Frisk v. Henarie, 32 Fed. 417,
422--24 (1887), rev'ed on other grounds, 142 U.S. 459 (1892), the language
difference was relied on to sustain a partial diversity action under the removal
section of the Judiciary Act of 1887. This interpretation of the statute allow-
ing partial diversity was followed in City of Detroit v. Detroit City Ity., 54
Fed. 1 (1893), cert. denied, 163 U.S. 683 (1895) but was overruled on non-
constitutional grounds in Cochran v. Montgomery County, 199 U.S. 260
(1905). See ALI, SoUDY 179 n.8. The argument based on the language differ-
ence assumes that a suit may be made up of several controversies, in any
one of which diversity between opposing parties will support federal jurisdiction
in the entire suit. But what Chief Justice Marshall said about an interest in
Strawbridge, that each distinct interest must be represented by persons capable
of suing or being sued in a .federal court, is equally applicable to this view
of a controversy. Indeed, the ALI's view of "controversy" and Marshall's "dis-
tinct interest" are the same.
49. See Mishhdn, The Federal "Question" in the District Courta, 53 CoLm.
L. REv. 157, 160-68, n25 (1953). The one case involves a question of con-
gressional intent, which can be more definitively expressed by subsequent
enactment in case of erroneous interpretation; the other requiries a constitu-
tional amendment if too estrictive an interpretation is given. See Shoshone
Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 506 (1900) (A restrictive interpretation
given to a federal jurisdiction statute is justified by referring to the question
as "not one of the power of Congress, but of its intent."); ALI, SVruy 177.
50. ALI, Sruny 183-85. However, the adoption of the Constitution and
the enactment of the Judiciary Act were so close in time that such a distinc-
tion in -purpose seems tenuous. A sounder basis for distinguishing Strawbridge
might be provided by openly recognizing the advantages and appropriateness
of construing constitutional grants of power broadly when it serves a legiti-
mate present day purpose. See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 18 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 406-07, 421 (1819).
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diction based on less than total diversity;"' examples are removal
cases,5 2 intervention, 3 and interpleader.
5 4
B. SECTION 2341
In analyzing the effect and desirability of proposed section
2341," 5 at least four interests must be considered, the plaintiff's,
51. See Cohen, Problems in the Removal of a "Separate and Independent
Claim or Cause of Action," 46 MINN. L. REv. 1, 20-25 (1961); Reed, Compul-
sory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MrcH. L. REv. 483, 525, 527-29
(1957); Note, Diversity Requirements in Multi-Party Litigation, 58 CoLum.
L. Ruv. 548 (1958); Developments in the Law: Multi-Party Litigation in the
Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. REv. 874, 999-95 (1958); Note, The Constitu-
tionality of Federal Removal Jurisdiction Over Separable Controversies In-
volving Citizens of the Same State, 94 U. PA. L. Rnv. Q39 (1946).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1958); see Levin, The Federal Courts' Hospital
Back Door- Removal of "Separate and Independent" Non-Federal Causes of
Action, 66 H1.4Ev. L. Rzv. 423 (1953).
53. See the discussion of Drumright v. Texas Sugarland Co., 16 F.2d 657
(5th Cir. 1927), in Reed, supra note 51, at 527-29.
54. Haynes v. Felder, 239 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1957).
55.
§ 2841. Dispersed necessary parties; original diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action in 'which the several defendants who are necessary for a just
adjudication of the plaintiff's claim are not all amenable to process of
any one territorial jurisdiction, and one of any two adverse parties is a
citizen of a State and the other is a citizen or subject of another terri-
torial jurisdiction.
(b) A defendant is necessary for a just adjudication of the plaintiff's
claim, within the meaning of this chapter, if complete relief cannot be
accorded the plaintiff in his absence, or if it appears that, under federal
law or relevant State law, an action on the claim would have to be dis-
missed if he could not be joined as a party. Persons against whom
several liability is asserted shall not 'be deemed necessary for a just
adjudication of the plaintiff's claim because liability is asserted against
them jointly or alternatively as well.
(c) A person is amenable to process of a territorial jurisdiction, for
the purposes of this section, if, and only if, that person -
(1) being an individual, has 'his domicil or an established resi-
dence or his principal place of employment or business activity in
that jurisdiction; or
(2) being a corporation or other entity sued as such, is incorpo-
rated or has its principal office in that jurisdiction; or
(3) has an agent in that jurisdiction authorized by appointment
to receive service of process; or
(4) may, under the laws of that jurisdiction, be subjected to a
fully effective judgment of its courts without delivery of process
within the territorial jurisdiction to him or his agent authorized by
appointment to receive it.
ALI, STUry 35-36, 130-37.
the interest of defendants over whom a state court cannot exercise
jurisdiction, the federal interest, and the interest of the states.
The adoption of proposed section 2341 would strike a new
balance between the interests of the plaintiff and extra-territorial
defendants. Presently, absentee defendants can be subjected to
the jurisdiction of a state court only if it would be reasonable to
require them to defend an action in that court. Proposed section
2341 would subject absentees to the jurisdiction of a federal court
without regard to the burden on them, if they are beyond the
jurisdiction of any state court and "necessary for a just adjudica-
tion of the plaintiff's claim."56 If the plaintiff is otherwise unable
to obtain relief, the equities in his favor are clear. But the neces-
sary party situations encompassed by the ALI proposals present
a harder case. A suit against joint obligors from different states
would be permissible under section 2341 even though the plaintiff
would be able to obtain complete relief in state courts by bringing
separate actions. It is true that the plaintiff has to assume a risk
of inconsistent verdicts if he brings separate actions, but very
little consideration is given to the burden that will be imposed on
widely separate joint obligors if they are forced to defend in the
same action. 7 Proposed section 2344(e)58 does authorize the fed-
eral district court to dismiss the action, totally or in part, if no
interested party has more than five thousand dollars at stake. But
this section affords no comfort to the defendant having a small
interest in the controversy if anyone's interest exceeds five thou-
sand dollars. 9 A better adjustment of the conflicting interests of
the plaintiff and absentee defendants could be achieved by in-
56. Ibid.; see Kurland, The New Field Code, 11 U. Chli. Law School Record
11, 12 (Autumn 1963).
57. Proposed § 2342 provides:
A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded solely on section 2341 of
this title may be brought only in a district where a substantial part of
the events or omissions giving rise to the clai occurred or where a
substantial part of property which is the subject of the action is situ-
ated, except that where there is no -such district within the United
States, the action may be brought in any district where any party
resides.
ALI, STUDY 36-37. If the state's jurisdictional statute does not go to the due
process limitations, then perhaps the burden on the absent defendant will not
be too severe. But, if under the fourteenth amendment it is unreasonable to
require the absentee to defend an action there, the problem is a serious one.
58. ALI, STUDY 41.
59. Serious problems arise in determining when an interest exceeds a given
dollar amount. See, e.g., McDonald v. Patton, 240 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1957);
Note, Federal Jurisdictional Amount. Determination, of te Matter in Con-
troversi, 73 HARv. L. Rav. 1369 (1960).
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creasing the discretionary power of the district court to dismiss
an action, taking into consideration both the burden on the de-
fendants and the possibility of the plaintiff obtaining complete
relief in separate actions.60
The federal government may have a legitimate interest in pro-
viding a forum for litigation arising from national activities in
cases that would not otherwise be heard or would be heard at
some cost in efficiency and fairness.61 A countervailing considera-
tion is the burden proposed section 2341 would impose on the
federal district courts. Two prerequisites to federal district court
jurisdiction are established by proposed section 2841, no state
court is capable of hearing the plaintiff's suit in its entirety and
the defendant or defendants making state court jurisdiction im-
possible must be necessary to a just adjudication of the plain-
tiff's claim. Although the main thrust of the section is to provide
a forum when no state court can give the plaintiff relief, the
"necessary to a just adjudication" test incorporates a federal
standard of necessary parties as well as those parties without
whom either a state or federal court would have to dismiss the
action.2 This expansion of the number of parties about whom a
determination concerning amenability to state court process must
be made makes the determination quantitatively more difficult.
The ALI draftsmen attempt to minimize the burden by pointing
out that proposed section 2341(c)68 establishes objective factors
as the basis for the determination, that investigation of these
factors will likely be confined to only one or two state jurisdic-
tions, and that in no event will the number exceed that with which
the defendant least amenable to process was involved. 4 The first
three of section 2341(c)'s criteria by which to determine state
judicial jurisdiction, whether an individual has his residence,
domicile, or principal place of business there, a corporation its
principal office there, or either has an agent authorized to receive
process there, are undeniably easy to apply. The fourth criterion,
however, whether the defendant would be subject to an effective
judgment of the local court if process were not served on the de-
fendant or his agent within the territorial limits of the jurisdic-
60. This would resemble the process of applying the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. See note 27 supra. A transfer of venue can achieve no more than
to fix the place of trial at the optimum location for all concerned - this could
still seriously 'burden one or more defendants.
61. See text accompanying note 82 infra.
62. See ALI, STrun 129, 134-35.
63. See note 55 supra.
64. ALI, STuDy 131 n.19, 137 n.26.
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tion, is not at all easy to apply 5 If the defendant does not fit
within the three factual categories, the district court must decide
what may be a very difficult question of state law in order to
establish its jurisdiction. The question must be decided for each
jurisdiction that could conceivably entertain the suit. It does not
help to say that the number of state jurisdictions that must be
considered is limited to those with which the least amenable de-
fendant is involved. Who is the least amenable defendant depends
upon which jurisdiction is being considered, not vice versa.
The closer a state gets to extending its jurisdiction to the con-
stitutional limits, the more difficult becomes the jurisdictional
determination in the federal district court. Under the Rhode
Island long arm statute,6 for example, the preliminary jurisdic-
tional question in the district court becomes one of constitutional
dimensions. Perspective is gained by noting the reluctance of the
Supreme Court to decide hypothetical constitutional questions0
Deciding the preliminary jurisdictional question would seri-
ously interfere with state interests as well as burden the federal
district courts. By design the cases to which proposed section 2841
might apply involve questions as to the outermost limits of state
process. These questions involve considerations of state policy
peculiarly suited to state court determination. To allow a federal
court to determine the outermost reach of state court jurisdiction
hypothetically,6 8 as a preliminary to accepting jurisdiction, would
prejudice the state. In the first place, a state court would be un-
able to hear the particular controversy if the federal court ad-
versely determined the jurisdictional question. Atkinson v. Superior
Court' 9 exemplifies a situation where after careful consideration a
state court may assume jurisdiction under a fact situation that
would likely be given short shrift if decided hypothetically by the
district court.7 0 In Atkinson the court's decree bound an absent
65. This fourth criterion requires a determination of whether the de-
fendant could be subjected to a judgment in rem or quasi-in-rem as well as
whether he would be amenable to process for personal jurisdiction purposes.
See Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P2d 960 (1957), appeal
dismissed and cert. denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
66. RI. GEN. Lws AMx. § 9-5-33 (Supp. 1963).
67. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
68. Of. Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A
Role for the Courts, 48 Mmm. L. REv. 643, 688-92 (1964).
69. 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.d 960 (1957), appeal dimissed and cert. denied,
357 US. 569 (1958).
70. See also Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 IlL
2d 432, 176 N.E.d 761 (1961).
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trustee in a controversy between two rival in-state claimants to
the proceeds from a trust fund. A state's legitimate interest in
providing a forum for its citizens in this type of controversy might
be denied under section 2341. Secondly, because the jurisdiction
of the state courts and the federal district courts is mutually ex-
clusive under proposed section 2341, a liberal assumption of juris-
diction by the federal courts under this section could not help but
restrict the jurisdiction of the state courts in the future."' Even
though the state jurisdictional question determined in the federal
courts would not bind the state court in subsequent decisions," it
would be at least persuasive. Furthermore, once the district court
has determined that it has jurisdiction over the controversy, future
litigants would likely bring the same kind of actions in the district
court - not giving the state court a chance to clarify its jurisdic-
tional reach. Thus an inward pressure would be exerted on the
expansion of state court jurisdiction, which might disturb the
balance of federalism.
A solution to the problems raised by a hypothetical federal
court determination of a state's jurisdictional limitations might
be sought through abstention or certification. If the jurisdictional
question appeared difficult, the district court might abstain from
accepting jurisdiction pending a determination by the relevant
state court or courts. Or the federal court could request a certifica-
tion as to jurisdiction from the relevant state courts. The diffi-
culty with abstention by the federal court is the burden to which
it would put the parties. The plaintiff would have to attempt to
bring his action in as many different courts as the federal court
would have to consider if it decided the jurisdictional question
hypothetically. Seeking a certification from the state courts that
could conceivably entertain the suit would be a better approach,
but it is doubtful that certification presently has this wide an
application.Y
71. The ALI draftsmen decided to permit assumption of jurisdiction in
cases not authorized by state statutes rather than draw the line at the consti-
tutional disability of the states to assume jurisdiction. This avoids the prob-
lem of creating a series of constitutional decisions determining when the
indispensable-necessary party cases can be brought in the federal district
court. ALI, SrTun 123-24.
72. See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 489, 501-02 (1954). If the district court decision were 'based on consti-
tutional grounds rather than on interpretation of the state's jurisdictional
statutes, the decision would bind the state court in future decisions.
73. See Vestal, The Certified Question of Law, 36 IowA L. REV. 029, 643-
46 (1951).
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Proposed section 2343, 4 which permits a defendant to remove
to a federal district court when a party necessary for a just adjudi-
cation as to him cannot be brought before the state court in which
plaintiff originated the action, would not create problems of the
same magnitude as those arising under proposed section 2341. The
prejudice to the defendant which justifies bringing the absent
party before the court goes beyond merely inconveniencing the
defendant. The defendant under section 2343 must be inade-
quately protected in the suit as it exists in the state court in order
to remove and take advantage of the nationwide service of process
provided in the federal district court.
The burden on the federal district court in determining whether
it could take jurisdiction would be less under proposed section
2343 than under proposed section 2341. First, the federal court
74.
§ 243. Dispersed necesary parties diversity of citizenship jurisdiction;
removal of actions brought in State courts
(a) Any civil action commenced in a State court in which one or
more additional parties necessary for a just adjudication as to a de-
fendant cannot be joined or with the exercise of reasonable diligence
served with process or otherwise made subject to a fully effective judg-
ment of the courts of that State, may be removed by any adversely
affected defendant to the district court for the district and division
embracing -the place where such action is pending if one of any two
adverse parties is a citizen of a State and the other is a citizen or sub-
ject of another territorial jurisdiction.
In actions wherein jurisdiction is founded on this section, the word
"parties" as used in this chapter includes all persons named in the
petition for removal as necessary for a just adjudication as to the de-
fendant, whether or not such persons were named or joined as parties
in the action in the State court.
(b) A person is necessary for a just adjudication as to a defendant,
within the meaning of this chapter, if he claims or may claim an inter-
est relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his
absence may leave ,the defendant subject to a substantial risk of in-
curring double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligation by reason
of -his claimed interest. A person is not thus necessary for a just adjudi-
cation simply -because he is or may be liable to a defendant for all or
part of the -plaintiff's claim against the defendant.
(c) A counterclaim asserted in a State court arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence as the plaintiffs claim shall be deemed an
action for purposes of this section, and if the requirements hereof are
met, the entire State court action may ,be removed. For the purpose
of determining whether absent persons are necessary for a just adjudi-
cation of such a counterclaim, a plaintiff in the State court shall be
considered as a defendant under subsection (b) of this section, and a
119,$
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would have to consider only one state court - that in the state in
which suit was brought- in order to determine whether the
absent party could be brought before the court. It need not be
determined, as it must under proposed section 2341, that no state
court could hear the entire controversy. Secondly, the federal
court need not determine the outermost limits of a state's assump-
tion of judicial jurisdiction under section 2343 as it must under
section 2341. Section 2343(d) requires only a certification by the
removing party that all reasonable effort has been made to sub-
ject the absent party to a fully effective judgment in the state
court. Thus, if the question as to the outermost limits of a state
court's jurisdiction arises, it will have been decided by the state
court.
The fait that the federal court does not have to decide the
limits of a state court's jurisdiction in order to establish its own
defendant therein as a plaintiff under subsection ('b) of section 2341 of
this title; for all other purposes of removing such action, including the
procedural steps therefor, original plaintiffs or defendants may be
deemed defendants.
A counterclaim asserted in a State court which does not arise out of
the -same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's claim shall be
deemed an action for the purposes of this section and may be removed
by a plaintiff in the State court action if as a defendant 'he would have
been able to remove under subsections (a) and (b) of this section.
(d) A petition for removal under this section shall contain a state-
ment that every reasonable effort has been made by or on behalf of the
removing party to have each absent person who is necessary for a just
adjudication as to -him made a party and served with process or other-
wise made subject to a fully effective judgment in the State court. In
addition -to meeting all the requirements of section 1446 of this title,
every such petition of a party represented 'by counsal shall be signed
by such counsel, which signature shall constitute a certificate that the
foregoing statement is correct.
(e) In any action where jurisdiction is founded solely on this sec-
tion, if there is a State court in which an action on the claim may be
maintained and to whose process all parties necessary for a just adjudi-
cation are answerable or agree to submit, the district court on motion
of any party or on its own motion may stay proceedings before it
pending prosecution of an action on the claim in the courts of that
State. In determining whether 'to stay proceedings for this purpose, the
district court shall take into account, in addition to the convenience
of parties and witnesses, whether the rules for decision of the action
or any substantial part thereof are the laws of the State in whose courts
the action would be prosecuted during pendency of the stay and the
reasons why the action was not commenced in that State court origi-
nally. The decision of a district court staying proceedings or refusing
to dissolve a stay under this subsection shall not be reviewable except
under the provisions of subsection (b) of section 1292 of this title.
ALl, STUDy 37-39, 138-46.
jurisdiction under section 2343 also reduces the interference with
state interests. Even though some cases that would ordinarily be
heard in a state court would be removed to a federal court, the
hypothetical decision of a difficult question of state law with
its far reaching consequences for federal-state relations is avoided.
D. FY EAL-STATE RxLAONS
Whether or not the Erie doctrine is constitutionally based,7 it
raises a serious problem of federal-state relations in connection
with the ALI proposals. The proposals would provide a forum in
cases which no state court would hear. This appears to violate
the outcome-determinative test announced in Guaranty Trust Co.
v. York" -the outcome is obviously different if the plaintiff is
enabled to recover. In Angel v. Bullington " the Supreme Court
determined that a federal district court sitting in diversity jurisdic-
tion could not hear a case the state prohibited its own courts from
hearing. Angel involved a North Carolina statute prohibiting de-
ficiency judgment suits. If state limitations on judicial jurisdiction
represent a legislative failure to keep up with the relaxation of the
fourteenth amendment due process requirements rather than an
affirmative expression of state policy,"8 then state interests are
not thwarted by providing a federal forum to hear cases the state
court could not hear." The difficulty lies in distinguishing juris-
dictional limitations imposed for substantive reasons from those
resulting from purposeless legislative inaction. The ALI proposals
do not attempt to do so. They would appear to permit a foreign
joint obligee to sue for a deficiency judgment even though the
75. Erie RR. v. TompkIns, 304 U.. 64, 78-80 (1938). Compare HART &
WECHSLER 616-17, with Eill, The Eri Doctrine and the Constitution (pts. 1 &
2), 53 Nw. U.L. Rav. 427, 541 (1958).
76. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
77. 380 U.S. 183 (1947).
78. There has -been a tendency to interpret state jurisdictional statutes,
framed in terms of the pre-Internationwl Shoe test of "doing business" in the
state, more liberally since the Internationa Shoe case relaxed the require-
ments for the assertion of jurisdiction. This may have reduced the pressure
on state -legislatures to expand their jurisdictional scope. See Developments in
the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HArv. L. ItRv. 909, 1000-02 (190).
79. See Erie ThR. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938). Fun. R. Cirv. P. 4(f)
authorizes the district courts to serve process within a 100-mile radius of the
forum, which may extend beyond the state boundaries. See the discussion of
the Erie problem raised by this rule in Kaplan, Amendments of tMe Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963 (1), 77 EURV. L. RPv. 601, 631-35 (1904).
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 US. 525 (1958), suggests the ap-
propriateness of balancing the state and federal interests.
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state in which the land was located would not permit such a suit
if it could constitutionally obtain jurisdiction over all the parties."
If the difficulty in making the distinction justifies a failure to at-
tempt it - which is not clear"' - something further is required
to justify the resultant interference with state policy.
If the justification for the ALI proposals is a strong federal
interest in providing a forum for litigation arising out of nation-
wide activities, then perhaps this interest can justifiably override
the states' interest in determining the application of their substan-
tive law. But the proposals merely provide a forum in which state
law can be applied- they create no substantive federal law. In
this light it is difficult to view the federal interest as one of over-
riding importance. s2 As long as the law to be applied is state law
there seems to be little reason to permit state policy to be frus-
trated by ignoring the substantive qualifications a state imposes.
As diversity jurisdiction is presently utilized, the federal courts
80. Section 2344(c) releases the district court in these cases from the
obligation to apply the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits, im-
posed in regular diversity cases by Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313
U.S. 487 (1941) and Griffin v. McCoach, 813 U.S. 498 (1941). ALI, STUDY 41,
147-50. The power to select the state law to be applied might constitute
"substance" in the sense that it determines the outcome of the suit, but as
long as no state court could have 'heard the case there can 'be no incentive
to forum shop between state and federal courts. In discussing § 2344(c) the
ALI draftsmen indicate that substantive policy embodied in state jurisdic-
tional limitations should 'be taken into account but cannot automatically pre-
vail because of the effect on parties beyond the reach of the state. See ALI,
STUDY 149.
81. An affirmative limitation on state court jurisdiction, such as the North
Carolina statute in Angel, is easily distinguished from limitations on state
court -service of process resulting from insufficient statutory authorization. The
difficult problem lies in determining whether and when state substantive
policy is embodied in a limited statutory authorization of the exercise of extra-
territorial jurisdiction. It would be possible to incorporate into the ALI
proposals the notion that any substantive limitations a state wished to put
on its jurisdictional reach must 'be expressly declared in order to be con-
sidered in applying state law under the proposals. The declaration in N.Y.
Cxv. PRAc. L. & R. § 302(a)(2) excepting defamation actions from the grant of
jurisdiction over persons committing torts within the state who cannot be
served within the state is an example. See 1 WEINSTERn, KoRN & MiraLit,
Nnw YORK CviL PrcTcmE 302.11 (1963), for a discussion of the substan-
tive reasons for the limitation. Many problems involving statutory interpre-
tation raise difficulties as serious as distinguishing jurisdictional limitations
based on oversight or a desire to avoid overloading state trial dockets from
those grounded on substantive policy considerations.
82. Cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, $53 U.S. 448, 479-82
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
must respect a state's denial of a forum in cases based on state
law. There does not appear to be anything peculiar about multi-
party cases that would justify overriding state policy embodied
in jurisdictional limitations for the sake of providing a forum.
If it is impossible to determine why a state limits the jurisdic-
tion of its courts and thereby impossible to avoid frustrating
state policy under the ALI proposals whenever state court juris-
diction is limited for substantive reasons, it would be worthwhile
to consider another approach to the indispensable-necessary party
problem. Suppose Congress authorized nationwide service of proc-
ess in the state courts in the kind of cases covered by the ALI
proposals. The advantages of this approach would be the avoid-
ance of the hypothetical determination in the federal courts of a
state's jurisdictional limitations, the ability of a state court to
apply its own substantive law in such a case, and-the preservation
of a state's right to limit its jurisdiction for substantive reasons
as it sees fit. Application of the judicial doctrine of forum non
conveniens3 would not be as satisfactory as the change of venue
provision in the ALI proposals84 for the purpose of allocating these
multiparty cases to the most appropriate forum for optimum
efficiency and fairness. But once it has been determined that it is
desirable to adjudicate these cases, the burden litigation imposes
on the various parties becomes a question of degree - some bur-
den on someone is a necessary result. The real problem with this
approach is the constitutional one - would the fourteenth amend-
ment due process restrictions on a state's exercise of extra-
territorial jurisdiction prevent such an authorization by Congress?
In Atkinson v. Superior Courts Justice Traynor contends that a
state court, without violating fourteenth amendment due process,
could hear any case a federal court could hear under the federal
interpleader provisions. If the due process limitations on a state
court's exercise of jurisdiction are solely a matter of fairness, then
Justice Traynor's position must be correct and there is no con-
stitutional problem. There is no difference between the burden of
defending in a state or federal court in the same area. But Hanson
v. Denckla6 indicates that the due process restrictions "are a con-
sequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective
83. It would, however, have to be more widely used than at present. See
Developments in the Law-State-ourt Jurisdiction, 73 H[Ahv. L. RPv. 909,
1008-17 (1960).
84. AL, STUDY 36-37, 137-38 (proposed § 2342).
85. 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dinmissed and cert. denied,
357 U.S. 569 (1958).
86. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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States."' The question is one of sovereignty, not fairness - this
is why Hanson phrases the jurisdictional test in terms of contacts
rather than solely in terms of reasonableness. 8 Hanson, however,
only makes it clear that, in the absence of congressional authoriza-
tion, a state court cannot exercise nationwide in personam juris-
diction. The addition of congressional authorization radically
alters the situation. This is not a simple case of Congress author-
izing the states to violate the fourteenth amendment - which
obviously cannot be done. Since the primary judicial objection to
state court exercise of nationwide in personam jurisdiction is the
limited sovereignty of the states, a declaration by the ultimate
sovereign authority, Congress, serving a legitimate federal pur-
pose, would eliminate the reason for holding the assertion of
jurisdiction unconstitutional." Although the Supreme Court can-
not permit congressional action to encroach upon due process
conceptions of fairness, a sovereignty question is a different mat-
ter. The Court's role as protector of the national interest is no
longer appropriate after Congress has spoken. Thus, with respect
to the commerce clause, the court has found congressional author-
ization dispositive on the question whether state regulation of
interstate commerce violates the Constitution. 0
CONCLUSION
It is impossible to determine how serious the indispensable-
necessary party problem is in terms of the number of persons
denied a fair adjudication. It seems likely that the number is
quite small.
Some of the difficulties raised by the ALI proposals - section
2341 in particular - might be obviated by giving more careful
consideration to the interests affected. But the basic problem
inherent in any ambitious grant of diversity jurisdiction, that of
coordinating the federal courts with state law and policy, is a
much harder one.
A possible alternative would be to authorize state courts to issue
nationwide service of process as a solution to the indispensable-
87. Id. at 251.
88. "However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a de-
fendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the 'minimal con-
tacts' with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over
him." Ibid.
89. Cf. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); Dowling,
Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revsed Version, 47 COLUm. L. REv.
547, 552-60 (1947).
90. Ibid.
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necessary party problem. The advantage of this approach is the
allocation of important state policy decisions to state courts.
If the alternative is not satisfactory -and it remains to be
carefully examined - it might be best to leave as the solution
to the indispensable-necessary party problem the partial one of
relaxation of the indispensable party doctrine and the expansion
of state court jurisdiction.

